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Abstract 
This study empirically estimates the fiscal consequences of terrorism in 
Pakistan by using annual time series data from 1984 to 2016. By employing 
the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) technique, the study has gauged 
the impact of terrorist incidents on two important facets of fiscal policy, 
namely, tax revenue and defense spending. The results reveal that terrorism 
has detrimental ramifications for fiscal policy in Pakistan. Specifically, on 
the one hand, an increase in terrorist incidents tends to bring a fall in tax 
revenue while on the other hand, they induce a rise in defense outlays, thus 
deteriorating both fronts of the fiscal position. Notably, the moderating role 
of institutional quality appears significant and indicates that institutional 
quality has not only a significant direct impact on fiscal policy, but it also 
helps in completely mitigating (reducing) the harmful impact of terrorism 
on defense spending (tax revenue) in Pakistan. These findings suggest that 
there is a need to take appropriate steps for strengthening institutional 
setup to control the fallouts of terrorism on fiscal behavior of the 
government of Pakistan. 
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1. Introduction  
The conceptual and operational definitions of terrorism 
have been rehabilitated since the 9/11 incident due to the 
victimization of world economic leader, massive destructions, and 
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long lasting socio economic and political implications. The 
incident has led to change the geopolitical relations of world 
economic and political powers as it has compelled many countries 
to become allies directly or indirectly in eradicating the roots of 
terrorist activities at national and international levels.  
Theoretically, terrorism is an act of violence to achieve 
various economic, political and ideological goals by means of 
threat and fear (Humphreys, 2006).1 Hence, any non-state actor 
creating threat, using illegal forces (intimidation or oppression) to 
achieve economic and/or a non-economic gains such as political, 
social or religious is termed as terrorism (LaFree & Dugan, 2017). 
The major purpose of terrorist activities is to obtain several 
benefits by pressurizing governments, and creating political 
disruptions which further create uncertainty in political regimes 
and interruption in policies. This leads to reallocation of resources 
from productive to non-productive activities (Michael, 2007). 
Over the course of time, the world has witnessed not only 
an increase in terrorist incidents but also an elevated severity 
attached to these episodes (Zakaria et al., 2019). Terrorism has 
various direct and indirect ramifications for victim countries. The 
direct consequences, for instance, include demolition of 
infrastructure, loss of human lives, and direct spending on 
armaments and security by the governments. The indirect 
implications, on the other hand, are hard to measure as terrorism 
hits economic activities by instigating uncertainty which then 
influences consumption and investment decisions, diverts 
government expenditures from development to non-development 
fronts such as maintaining law and order situation, improving 
security measures internally and externally. 
Empirically, economic consequences of terrorism have 
widely been discussed widely. The evidence proclaims that it 
deteriorates economic growth by increasing uncertainty, shattering 
 
1The Global Terrorism Database (LaFree and Dugan, 2017) defines 
terrorism as “the threat or actual uses of illegal force and violence by a non-
state actor to accomplish an economic, political, social or religious goal through 
oppression, fear and/or intimidation”. 
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investors’ confidence, deferring investment decision, reducing 
foreign direct investment and trembling stock market performance 
(Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009; Gries et al., 2011; Freytag et al., 
2011; Raza & Jawaid, 2013; Gaibulloev et al., 2013; Hyder et al., 
2015; Estrada et al., 2015; Shahzad et al., 2016; Shah et al., 2016).  
 
The recent surge in empirical literature is to examine not 
only the direct but also the indirect economic, social and political 
implications of terrorism through changing the composition of 
government expenditure.  As terrorism forces governments to shift 
resources towards improving law and order enforcement and 
reconstruction of affected areas, it not only hinders the process of 
economic growth but also reduces governments’ ability to generate 
revenue.  In developing countries, this increase in non-
developmental expenditures takes place at the expense of 
developmental expenditures (Michael, 2007). Gupta et al. (2004) 
conclude that persistent acts of terrorism lead to increase the share 
of military expenditures in total government outlays in low and 
middle income countries while the impact on tax revenue is 
reported as insignificant. Similarly, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) 
report that countries with a higher than median level of terrorism 
experience larger increase in military spending as compared to the 
countries with a lower than median level of terrorist incidents. 
They also show an insignificant impact of terrorism on tax 
revenue.  Moreover, Drakos and Konstantinou (2014) contend that 
terrorism leads to higher government spending on defence while it 
reduces the expenditure on social safety net. On the other hand, it 
distorts the tax base and contracts government revenues thus 
putting pressure on fiscal management. Cevik and Ricco (2015) 
document that the adverse impact of terrorism on tax revenue is 
only marginal while a significant increase in military spending has 
been observed in response to the increasing terrorist activities. 
Yogo (2015) also reveals that terrorist activities create uncertainty 
in the conduct of fiscal policy in developing countries. 
Pakistan constitutes a good case to be considered for 
examining fiscal response to terrorism as the country has remained 
a victim of extensive terrorist activities. It is an undeniable fact that 
Pakistan has been among those countries which are always at the 
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forefront of terrorist incidents due to various factors such as 
religious, geographical, ethnic, political, and economic- mainly 
unemployment and income inequality(Ismail & Amjad, 2014; 
Khan, et al., 2016; Syed et al., 2015). The incident of 9/11 has 
played a vital role in engorging terrorism in Pakistan. Terroris has 
trapped the country in social destruction, economic deterioration 
and political instability which is exerting huge pressure on 
government to manage this menace. For instance, studies such as 
(Hyder et al., 2015; Khan et al., 2016; Khan & Yusof, 2017; 
Mehmood, 2014; Shahbaz et al., 2013; Shahzad et al., 2016, 
Zakaria et al., 2019) conclude that the economic growth process is 
immensely deteriorated in Pakistan due to terrorism. In view of 
Farooq (2014) the cost of war against terrorism is much higher 
than its benefits to Pakistan. Moreover, the study shows that 
macroeconomic performance measured through various indicators 
has deteriorated due to terrorism while terrorism has increased 
government expenditure. Nasir and Shahbaz (2015) also report that 
terrorism Granger causes military expenditures in Pakistan. 
Shahzad et al. (2016) substantiate the claim that terrorism forces 
governments to redirect expenditure from developmental to non-
developmental projects such as increasing security standards for 
improving law and order situation. More recently, Zakaria et al. 
(2019) have identified the impact of terrorism, internal and 
external conflict on economic growth, fiscal spending, FDI, and 
domestic investment. The study concludes that terrorism adversely 
affects macroeconomic performance and puts pressure on fiscal 
budget by increasing government expenditures on managing 
security affairs of the country. Other studies examine the impact of 
terrorism on tourism (Rauf et al., 2016) environmental pollution 
(Bildiricia & Gokmenoglu, 2020); education policy (Iqbal, 2019) 
and financial market performance (Gul et al., 2010) of Pakistan.  
These studies have unanimously concluded that terrorism has 
adverse effects on macroeconomic performance no matter what 
indicator is used to measure it. 
To eradicate the menace of terrorism, an effective anti-
terrorism campaign has been launched through Nation Action Plan, 
Zarb-e-Azb, and Operation Radd-ul- Fasaad in Pakistan. These 
initiatives have produced desired outcomes in reducing the number 
of terrorist attacks and severity of terrorism in Pakistan but at 
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massive financial and administrative costs (Government of 
Pakistan, 2017). Mubashra and Shafi (2018) also report that 
counter terrorism activities have short- and long-run effects on 
Pakistan’s economy.  On the one hand, the counter terrorism 
actions make fiscal position of government vulnerable due to 
higher defence and security spending, rehabilitation, and 
reconstruction. On the other hand, terrorism hampers economic 
activity, delays investment and consumption plans, discourages 
foreign direct investment, and reduces international trade; 
therefore, restricts government’s ability to collect revenues through 
tax and non-tax sources. Hence, terrorist activities are like a double 
edged sword for a developing country like Pakistan. 
Historically, defence spending has a major share in total 
outlays of the government of Pakistan because of various internal 
or external, and actual or perceived security concerns. It is 
observed that there are extreme fluctuations with an increasing 
trend in the defence spending (Government of Pakistan, 2017). 
Blomberg et al. (2004) describe that terrorism induces higher 
government spending to improve law and order, and security 
situation. On the contrary, the revenue side of the government of 
Pakistan does not exhibit an encouraging picture. For example, the 
tax revenue as percent of GDP has declined from a peak of 13.7 in 
1997 to 9.2 in 2016 (Government of Pakistan, 2017). This is 
alarming as over the years defence spending is mounting due to 
increasing security pressures; however, the resources to meet these 
expenditures are not supportive. As explained by earlier literature, 
an increase in defence expenditure crowds out not only public 
development expenditure but also private investment (Blomberg et 
al., 2004; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2008), hence, the revenue 
generating capacity of a government is certain to get squeezed. 
Despite voluminous literature on examining the 
consequences of terrorism, the literature is relatively scant on 
investigating the fiscal consequences of terrorism, particularly, in 
countries which are not only major victims of terrorism but are 
also on the frontline in the war on terror. In this perspective, 
Pakistan makes a good case to be investigated, particularly, in the 
wake of the 9/11 incident as Pakistan has played significant role in 
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the national and global war on terror. The existing literature mostly 
reports the economic consequences of terrorism, however, 
terrorism related research lacks the fiscal dimension in Pakistan. 
There are two empirical studies which have examined the fiscal 
consequences of terrorism in Pakistan, namely (Nasir & Shahbaz, 
2015; Zakaria et al., 2019). The former, by taking two variables 
model, concludes that terrorism Ganger causes military spending 
in Pakistan, while the later reports the impact of terrorism on 
overall public expenditures.  These studies, thus, do not provide a 
detailed insight to the fiscal consequences of terrorism. Therefore, 
to abridge this gap in the existing literature, the purpose of the 
present study is to estimate fiscal response to terrorism in Pakistan. 
To this end, we have taken two important aspects of fiscal policy; 
tax revenue as percent of GDP, and defence spending as percent of 
GDP. The first measure shows the strength of fiscal accounts while 
the latter presents the proportion of government revenues allocated 
for the security and law and order maintenance. Hence, both 
measures portray important facets of fiscal position of Pakistan and 
the impact of terrorism on these indicators will help us draw 
important findings for researchers as well as for policy-makers. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, few empirical studies have 
shown that terrorism creates disruption in fiscal policy by 
redirecting government expenditures towards defence spending 
and by reducing tax revenue, nonetheless, we have not come across 
any study which has gauged the role of factors which can 
mitigate/reduce the adverse impact of terrorism on fiscal position, 
specifically for Pakistan. Therefore, this study also aims to 
quantify the fiscal response to terrorism in Pakistan by 
incorporating the role of one such factor, namely, institutions. 
Institutions, as documented by North (1990) define the rules, 
explain the functioning of various sectors, and most importantly 
facilitate the transmission mechanism of stabilisation policies. In 
addition, by defining the rules and setting the parameters, 
institutions help in mitigating the menace of various shocks 
including terrorism. In the similar vein, Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2010) emphasize the significance of institutions for better 
economic and political performance. They argue that good 
institutions ensure accountability, transparency, and good 
governance, therefore, help in effective policy formulation as well 
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as proper implementation of these policies. Hence, this study aims 
to introduce the moderating role of institutional quality in 
terrorism-fiscal policy nexus of Pakistan. The moderating role of 
institutional quality is captured by introducing an interaction term 
of terrorism and institutional quality index. In doing so, we 
quantify not only the direct impact of terrorism on fiscal policy but 
also its conditional impact through institutional quality. Finally, the 
empirical analysis is conducted by employing the Autoregressive 
Distributive Lag (ARDL) technique over the period of 1984 to 
2016. This technique enables the study to quantify the short run as 
well as the long run implications of terrorism for fiscal policy of 
Pakistan in the presence of institutional quality.  
The rest of the study is structured as follows: section 2 contains the 
methodology, data and estimation technique; section 3 presents 
empirical findings followed by section 4 which concludes the 
study. 
2. Analytical Framework 
2.1. Model Specification and Data 
There is a paucity of research work pertaining to fiscal 
response to terrorism. In existing body of relevant literature, we 
find the application of single equation models for executing the 
desired empirical task. For determining the fiscal behaviour of a 
government various economic, political and institutional factors 
play their roles. However, in an empirical investigation only 
selected macroeconomic determinants of fiscal actions are 
incorporated. To this end choice of explanatory variables depends 
upon the objectives of the study keeping in view the nature of 
fiscal action. As our study aims to estimate fiscal response to 
terrorism in the presence of institutional quality through gauging 
effect of terrorist incidents on tax revenue collection and defence 
spending in Pakistan, therefore, terrorism and institutional quality 
variables have been plugged into the standard econometric models 
of tax revenue and defence spending. Considering the relevance 
with our study, we prefer to use modified versions of   regression 
models presented by (Maizels & Nissanke, 1986; Teera, 2003; 
Gupta et al., 2004; Cevik & Ricco, 2015; Chuku et al., 2019). 
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Thus, to conquer the basic aim of the study we specify the 
following econometric models: 
𝑇𝐴𝑋 = 𝑓(𝑇𝐸𝑅, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅, 𝐼𝑁𝐹, 𝐺𝐸, 𝐴𝐼𝐷)     (1) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋 = 𝑓(𝑇𝐸𝑅, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅, 𝐼𝑁𝐹, 𝐺𝐸, 𝐴𝐼𝐷, 𝐼𝑁𝑆, 𝑇𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑆)        (2)  
𝐷𝐹𝑆 = 𝑔(𝑇𝐸𝑅, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅, 𝑇𝐵, 𝐴𝐼𝐷, 𝐷𝐹𝑆𝐼)                          (3) 
𝐷𝐹𝑆 = 𝑔(𝑇𝐸𝑅, 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅, 𝑇𝐵, 𝐴𝐼𝐷, 𝐷𝐹𝑆𝐼, 𝐼𝑁𝑆, 𝑇𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑆)  (4) 
The present study uses the annual time series data of Pakistan over 
the period 1984 to 20162. In above models, TER refers to log of 
number of terrorist attacks (or incidents) reported in a year, TAX 
indicates tax revenue as percent of GDP, GDPGR indicates 
economic growth performance proxied by growth rate of real GDP, 
INF is inflation rate i.e. annual growth rate of consumer price 
index (CPI), GE refers to Gross public expenditure(as percent of 
GDP), AID  refers to foreign aid i.e. foreign Loans and foreign 
Grants as percent of GDP, DFS indicates defence spending as 
percent of GDP, TB shows trade balance as percent of GDP, DFSI 
shows defense spending of India as percent of GDP, INS refers to 
Institutional quality index( composite index of five aspects relating 
to institutional quality namely bureaucratic quality; corruption; 
democratic accountability; ethnic tensions and law and order). We 
have constructed the institutional quality index by means of 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) technique. These five 
indicators are converted into scale of 1-10 respectively for 
comparability purpose. TER*INS indicates interaction term of 
number of terrorist attacks and institutional quality index. The 
interaction term captures the impact of terrorism on each aspect of 
fiscal policy in presence of institutional quality. The coefficient of 
the interaction term will identify whether institutional quality in 
Pakistan is helpful in completely eliminating/minimizing the 
adverse impact of terrorism. Number of terrorist attacks variable is 
logarithmic throughout our estimation task. The details of data 
sources for each of these variables is given in table 1.  
 
2The selection of time period is based on the availability of data on institutional 
quality index which is available only from 1984-2016. 
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 Table 1. Variables’ Description and Data Source 
Variable Construction Data Source 
TAX Tax revenue as percent of GDP Government Financial Statistics published  by IMF 
(2018) GE Gross public expenditure as percent of GDP 
GDPGR Economic growth performance proxied by 
growth rate of  GDP  
World Development Indicators published by World 
Bank (2019) 
 INF Inflation rate i.e. annual growth rate of 
consumer price index (CPI) 
AID Foreign aid i.e. foreign loans and foreign 
grants as percent of GDP 
DFS Defence spending as percent of GDP 
TB Trade balance as percent of GDP 
DFSI Defence spending of India as percent of 
GDP 
INS Institutional quality index( composite index 
of five aspects relating to institutional 
quality) 
International Country Risk Guide by PRS group 
(2013) 
TER Number of terrorist attacks reported in a 
year.  
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) introduced by 
LaFree and Dugan (2017) and maintained by the 
University of Maryland. 
TER*INS Interaction term of number of terrorist 
attacks and institutional quality index 
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In models (1) and (2) terrorism is expected to bring a 
decline in tax revenue collection due to its detrimental effect on 
economic activities and business (Gupta et. al., 2004). Growth rate 
of GDP has expected positive relation with tax revenue as increase 
in economic growth performance is likely to promote business 
activities and expand the size of the economy, leading to raise 
public revenue through taxes.Inflation is expected to cause a fall in 
tax revenue because rising trend of general price level means 
decrease in purchasing power of public which will certainly open 
the doors for tax evasion on the part of tax payers. Moreover, 
inflation will also lower the value of tax revenue collected by the 
government. Rise is government expenditure is expected to raise 
tax revenue as postulated by (Barro’s, 1974; Peacock & 
Wiseman’s, 1979) spend-revenue hypothesis. Aid-Taxation 
relationship may be positive or negative, depending upon the 
composition of aid, conditionalities attached with aid, existing tax 
system in a country and government behaviour (Gupta et al., 2004; 
Benedek et al., 2014). Good quality intuitional set up is more likely 
to create incentives for investment, technology adoption, and 
opportunity to accumulate human capital for workers, leading to 
create a very conducive environment for business and hence for 
enhancing tax collection (Hussain et al., 2016). The expected link 
of interaction term of terrorism and institutional quality to tax 
revenue is ambiguous as it is subject to the extent to which 
institutional quality succeeds in overcoming ill effects of terrorism 
on tax revenue. 
As far as models (3) and (4) are concerned, it is expected 
that defence spending will increase with the occurrence of terrorist 
incidents as anti-terrorism actions require more expenditure on 
security. Economic growth has an expected positive association 
with defence spending because a growing economy has an 
enhanced capacity to increase its defence allocations (Dunne et al., 
2003). The share of the trade balance in GDP reflects the openness 
of an economy and its nature of link with defence spending is 
ambiguous (Rosh, 1988; Dunne et al., 2003). Similarly, whether 
foreign aid hinders or promotes defence spending is also unclear 
(Kono & Montinola, 2013). Pakistan’s defence spending is 
expected to respond India’s defence allocations positively since 
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Pakistan has serious security threats from India (Chawla, 2001; 
Sheikh et al., 2013; Aslam et al., 2014). The institutional quality’s 
relationship is likely to be negative with defence spending because 
countries with better institutional quality would have fewer 
chances of using military action to solve external and internal 
disputes (Desta, 2009). Finally, expected link of interaction term of 
terrorism and institutional quality with defence spending is 
ambiguous. 
2.2. Estimation Technique 
The selection of an estimation methodology relies on the 
nature of data set used in an estimation process. As the present 
study deals with time series data, therefore, the estimation begins 
with examining the unit root properties of all variables given in 
models (1) to (4). To this end, the study employs the renowned 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)test3. This test is based on the 
null hypothesis that a given times series contains a unit root.  
For estimation purpose of all the four models pertaining to 
the fiscal response to terrorism,the study has used the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegration technique 
developed by Pesaran et al. (2001).4 This technique is considered 
quite useful in obtaining consistent parameter estimates whether 
the underlying regressors are I (0), I (1) or a combination of both. 
Moreover, it is capable enough to yield efficient and consistent 
empirical results for the small data size like ours. The ARDL 
representations of the equations (1) and (4) can be formulated as: 
 
3For robustness check, we have also employed an alternate unit root test namely 
PP test (Phillips-Perron) unitroot test.  
4Other time series techniques are GMM-IV technique, VECM, FMOLS and 
DOLS techniques. However, these all require same order to integration or level 
of stationarity for all variables. ARDL is the only technique available which 
provides efficient estimates under different order of integration of regressors and 
I(1)  for the dependent variable. Therefore, this study has used ARDL estimation 
technique for empirical estimation of all models. 
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∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑆)𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛿9𝐷𝐹𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛿10𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡−1
+ 𝛿11𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑡−1 + 
𝛿12𝑇𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝛿13𝐴𝐼𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛿14𝐷𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑡−1 + 𝛿15𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑡−1 + 𝛿16(𝑇𝐸𝑅 ∗
𝐼𝑁𝑆)𝑡−1 + 𝑢4𝑡(8)  
 
In equations (5) to (8), the coefficients attached with 
difference operators measure short run dynamics, whereas, the 
parameters attached with one period lagged variables capture the 
long run relationships.  Notably, β8 and β16in equation 6 represent, 
respectively, the direct and conditional impact of terrorism on tax 
revenue as percent of GDP while δ8 and δ16 in equation 8 capture, 
respectively, the direct and conditional impact of terrorism on 
defence spending as percent of GDP. For checking the existence of 
long run relationship between fiscal variables and all explanatory 
variables, we formulate four null hypotheses of no cointegration 
for equations (5) to (8) as follows: 
 
𝛼7 = 𝛼8 = 𝛼9 = 𝛼10 = 𝛼11 = 𝛼12 = 0 
𝛽9 = 𝛽10 = 𝛽11 = 𝛽12 = 𝛽13 = 𝛽14 = 𝛽15 = 𝛽16 = 0 
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𝛾7 = 𝛾8 = 𝛾9 = 𝛾10 = 𝛾11 = 𝛾12 = 0 
𝛿9 = 𝛿10 = 𝛿11 = 𝛿12 = 𝛿13 = 𝛿14 = 𝛿15 = 𝛿16 = 0 
Equations (5) to (8) are representing four error correction 
models in which the lagged error correction term (ECT) in each 
case is obtained through the linear combination of lagged level 
variables. Pesaran et al. (2001) provide new critical values for the 
standard F test with a view to test null hypothesis of No 
cointegration. In this regard, an upper bound critical value is used 
when all regressors in a given model are integrated of order one 
i.e.I(1). A lower bound critical value is employed when all 
regressors are stationary at level i.e.I(0). However, theyestablish 
that the upper bound critical values are still valid in case some 
regressors are I(0) and some are I(1). 
3.  Discussion of Results  
3.1. Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
As we are working with time series data, therefore, it seems 
essential to commence our empirical task by probing the 
stationarity properties of all the time series included in models (1) 
to (4) using ADF unit root test.Results displayed in table 2 show 
that all time series are integrated of order one i.e., I (1) except 
terrorism and foreign aid which are integrated of order zero i.e., I 
(0)5. The mixed order of integration of regressors makes a valid 
case to use the ARDL technique in the present study.  
After selecting optimal lag using the Schwartz Bayesian 
Criteria, value of F-test statistic is estimated to test the null 
hypotheses of no cointegration in case of all the four models i.e.  
(5)  to (8) as an initial crucial step.In table 3 we can see that 
acomparison between calculated value of F-test statistic with that 
of its critical counterpart as provided by Pesaran et. al. (2001) 
reveals that null hypotheses of no cointegration between fiscal 
variables and all the regressors are rejected in case of all the four 
 
5For robustness check, we have also employed an alternate unit root test namely 
PP test (Phillips-Perron) unitroot test. The estimates reports the mixed order of 
integration of selected variables and are listed in Appendix 1. 
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models i.e. (5) to (8). Hence, it turns out that selected fiscal 
variables forms a long run relationship with the explanatory 
variables given in models (5) to (8). 
 
Table 2. Unit Root Test Results 






Integration  Level 1stDifference 
TAX 1.032 -6.678 -3.558 I(1) 
TER -4.079 - -3.558 I(0) 
GDPGR -3.423 -7.118 -3.558 I(1) 
INF -2.307 -6.868 -3.558 I(1) 
GE -2.703 -5.947 -3.558 I(1) 
AID -4.003 - -3.558 I(0) 
INS -1.282 -4.599 -3.558 I(1) 
TER*INS -1.920 -7.782 -3.558 I(1) 
DFS -0.829 -4.942 -3.558 I(1) 
TB -2.182 -6.314 -3.558 I(1) 
DFSI -1.224 -4.818 -3.558 I(1) 
 
Table 3: Cointegration Test 
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statiscs are presented in table 4. These 
statistics indicate that the mean value of  tax revenue and fiscal 
spending in Pakistan are higher than the standard deviation hence 
we may conclude that variation in these variables are not large. 
Model F-stat 
Value 
F-statistic Critical Value (5% 
Significance Level) 
       Outcome 
I(0) I(1) 
1 5.16 2.62 3.79 Cointegration 
2 22.23 2.32 3.50 Cointegration 
3 4.84 2.62 3.79 Cointegration 
4 7.87 2.32 5.50 Cointegration 
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Notably, the mean value of DFS is higher than the mean value of 
DFSI indicating that, on average, Pakistan defence expenditures(as 
percent of GDP) are higher than India. Similarly, it is bserved that 
standard deviations of DFS is higher than DFSI. On average 
Pakistan has expeienced 411 terrorist attacks with huge variation 
of 610. The maximum number of attacks experienced by the 
county is reported as 2214.  On average Pakistan’s trade balance 
emerged as negative with moderate standard deviation oevr the 
selected period of time.  
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Obs Mean  S.D Min Max 
TAX 33 11.38 1.60 8.94 13.71 
DFS 33 5.06 1.58 3.26 7.60 
TER 33 411.61 610.52 0 2214 
GDPGR 33 4.52 1.88 1.01 7.71 
INF 33 8.18 3.97 2.54 20.28 
GE 33 20.56 5.18 13.32 29.42 
AID 33 3.94 1.61 1.28 7.23 
TB 33 -5.35 3.56 -12.39 1.03 
DFSI 33 2.91 0.401 2.39 3.95 
INS 33 2.46 1.45 1 4.78 
 
3.3. Tax Revenue and Terrorism: Role of Institutional Quality 
As a next step, we focus on the outcomes of estimation 
endeavours of models (5) to (8) one by one. We take start with the 
interpretation of results of model 5 contained in table 5 which has 
three sections. In the upper section, long run estimates of tax to 
GDP ratio are presented. It can be seen that terrorism is 
significantly associated with tax revenue collection with a negative 
signin Pakistan. This finding is in accordance with theoretical 
prediction that terrorism adversely impacts tax collection efforts. 
The coefficient of terrorism carries the value-0.116 which implies 
that one percent increase in terrorist attacks leads to bring 0.116 
percent decline in tax to GDP ratio in Pakistan. Since 1980s, 
terrorism has become endemic with recurrent attacks and 
extremely high fatalities in Pakistan. The incidence of terrorist 
attacks has significantly increased in wake of the USA attacks on 
Afghanistan in 2001. Domestic business and investment activities 
have severely affected from persistently occurring curse in the 
country which has adverse ramifications for tax collection. 
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Table 5. Tax Revenue and Terrorism 
Dependent Variable: Tax Revenue 
                            Selected Model: ARDL(1,2,2,1,1,1) 
Regressor Coefficient            t-value 
TER -0.116** -2.513 
GDPGR 0.262*** 3.814 
INF -0.077** -2.491 
GE 0.497*** 3.356 
AID -0.441** -2.232 
Error Correction Model: Short Run Estimates 
Regressor Coefficient       t-value 
Constant 6.011*** 6.415 
D(TER) -0.254 -0.952 
D(TER)t-1 -0.381 -1.424 
D(GDPGR) 0.143* 1.928 
D(GDPGR)t-1 0.367 1.133 
D(INF) -0.113** -3.074 
D(GE) 0.156*** 5.742 
D(AID) -0.095** -2.948 
ECTt-1 -0.781*** -6.944 
Diagnostic Tests 
𝜒𝑆𝐶
2 = 0.312(0.656)                                     𝜒𝐻
2= 0.845(0.414)                                                                                                                                 
𝜒𝐹𝐹
2  =  0.981(0.282)                                    𝜒𝑁
2= 1.312(0.461) 
Note:***, **and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively,χ_SC^2,χ_H^2,χ_FF^2and  χ_N^2 denote LM test for serial 
correlation, heteroscedasticity,functional form  and normality  respectively. The 
associated p values are in parentheses. 
 
This finding substantiates the argument put forward by 
Gupta et al. (2004) that terrorism results in crumbling tax base 
through devastation of business firms and hampering the tax 
administration with net outcome of fall in tax revenue collection. 
Moreover, this outcome corroborates with what have been 
documented by (Gupta et al., 2004; Cevik & Ricco, 2015; Chuku 
et al., 2019). 
  
Among other determinants of tax revenue, we find that 
economic growth performance and public spending are positively 
while inflation rate and foreign aid are negatively associated with 
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tax to GDP ratio in Pakistan. All these findings are in accordance 
with our expectations. Persistent and strong economic growth 
performance stimulates business activities and employment level 
in a country which helps to raise tax to GDP ratio. The positive 
impact of public spending on tax revenue with statistical 
significance validates the spend-revenue hypothesis developed by 
(Barro, 1974; Peacock & Wiseman, 1979). This hypothesis is 
based on the notion that variations in government expenditure lead 
to produce changes in tax revenue i.e. at first, a government spends 
and then it strives for covering the expenditures through taxes. The 
adverse influence of inflation on tax revenue can be explained 
through the loss of purchasing power caused by rising price level 
that may result in tax evasion by the tax payers and value of tax 
collected. Finally, foreign aid adversely impacts tax revenue 
implying that the persistent dependence on foreign economic 
assistance did not let our decision makers to take appropriate 
measures for expanding the tax base in the country. Furthermore, 
the successive governments intentionally avoided introducing 
certain essential reforms in taxation system in order to please 
business community, industrialists and big land holders in the 
country due to flows of foreign aid in Pakistan. On fiscal front it 
can safely be stated that foreign aid is one of the hurdles in the way 
of increasing tax to GDP ratio in the country. 
However, in the short run, we find that terrorism has no 
role in shaping the behaviour of tax to GDP ratio in Pakistan (see 
middle section of table 5). This finding is justified on the ground 
that terrorist incidents do not spontaneously influence different  
sectors of an economy and business activities to a great extent and 
hence the tax generating capacity of a country like Pakistan is 
more likely to remain unaffected from the acts of terrorists. Rest of 
explanatory variables are found significant having expected impact 
akin to their long run effects.  
The coefficient of lagged error correction term (ECT) 
carries a negative sign which signifies stability of long run 
equilibrium relationship between tax revenue as percent of GDP 
and all the explanatory variables of model (1). The coefficient 
value of lagged ECT is -0.781with significance at 1% level. It 
specifies that if the long run equilibrium between tax to GDP ratio 
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and all the regressors of model (1) is disturbed, in every short run 
period, almost 78% correction towards restoring the long run 
equilibrium will take place. At the lower section of table 4, four 
diagnostic tests are reported which clearly depict that the estimated 
model does not suffer from serial correction, heteroscedasticity, 
functional form and normality issues. These outcomes actually 
increase our confidence on the overall findings of the estimated 
model. Finally, CUSUM and CUSUM of Squares tests suggest 
stability of the parameter estimates of estimated model as their 
plots stay within 5% level of significance (see figure 1). 
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In the next step, we incorporatethe role of institutional quality in 
the analysis. As apparent from table 6, institutional quality is a 
significant determinant of tax to GDP ratio in the long run. Positive 
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that a well-functioning institutional setup helps government for 
uplifting tax to GDP ratio. Coefficient of terrorist incidents again 
carries negative sign and its value is -0.151which suggests adverse 
consequence of terrorist activities for tax revenue efforts. 
  
 
The coefficient of interaction term (β16), capturing the 
conditional/indirect impact of terrorism through institutional 
quality, appears negative with statistical significance at 
Table 6. Tax Revenue and Terrorism: Role of Institutions 
Dependent Variable: TAX 
Selected Model: ARDL(1,1,1,2,1,2,1,1) 
Regressor Coefficient t-value 
TER -0.151** -2.795 
GDPGR 0.319** 2.593 
INF -0.150*** -3.924 
E 0.401* 1.833 
AID -0.277** -2.035 
INS 0.299** 2.324 
TER*INS -0.067** -2.523 
Error Correction Model: Short Run Estimates 
Dependent Variable: D(TAX) 
Regressor Coefficient       t-value 
Constant 3.180*** 7.873 
D(TER) -0.043 0.742 
D(GDPGR) 0.026 0.314 
D(INF) -0.134 -0.412 
D(INF)t-1 0.028 0.723 
D(GE) 0.121*** 6.893 
D(AID) -0.097*** -3.554 
D(AID)t-1 -0.036 -1.338 
D(INS) 0.146*** 9.244 
D(TER*INS) 0.058*** 4.077 
ECTt-1 -0.482*** -17.781 
Diagnostic Tests 
𝜒𝑆𝐶
2 = 0.642(0.420)                                     𝜒𝐻
2= 0.994(0.242)                                                                                                                                 
𝜒𝐹𝐹
2  =  0.728(0.385)                                    𝜒𝑁
2= 2.421(0.262) 




2 and  𝜒𝑁
2  denote LM test for serial 
correlation,heteroscedasticity, functional form and normality  respectively. 
The associated p values are in parentheses. 
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conventional level. This implies that even in the presence of 
institutional quality, terrorism imparts adverse impact on tax 
revenue. However, it is pertinent to mention that the size of the 
adverse impact reduces from -0.151 to -0.067 in presence of 
institutional quality. This finding reflects that the present structure 
of intuitional quality in Pakistan reduces the adverse impact of 
terrorism on tax revenue to some extent but not completely 
eliminating it. This directs our attention towards improving the 
current state of institutional quality in a manner that it not only 
directly improves the state of tax collection but also helps in 
eliminating the adversity of terrorism for revenue collection. 
Badshah et al. (2012) also explain that the existing set of 
institutions are not capable to play significant role in combating the 
pitfalls of terrorism in terms of socio political destructions. 
Therefore, a new set of institutions would be required to combat 
this menace. It is widely documented that institutions significantly 
contribute in the growth process both directly and indirectly. Good 
quality institutions help in channelizing the resources towards 
productive activities and results in higher investment levels, 
increase in social capital stock, and effective management of ethnic 
diversity and conflicts (Kemal, 2003). 
Rest of explanatory variables, namely, economic growth 
performance, inflation rate, government spending and foreign aid 
are all found significant and their impacts are similar to the first 
case (see table 5). 
In short run, terrorism emerges as insignificant factor in 
determining tax to GDP ratio (see middle section of table 6). 
Coefficient of institutional quality is significant with expected 
positive sign. Moreover, coefficient of interaction term of terrorism 
and institutional quality is significant with positivesign. This 
implies that institutional quality will not let tax revenue collection 
to fall despite the occurrence of terrorist attacks in the short run.  
Economic growth performance and inflation rate do not impact 
significantly tax to GDP ratio in the short run. Nonetheless, 
government spending and foreign aid exert positive and negative 
impact on tax to GDP ratio, respectively. 
From the outcomes of four diagnostic tests, we see that 
estimated model does not suffer from serial correction, 
heteroscedasticity, functional form and normality problems (see 
Fiscal Response to Terrorism in Pakistan                                      |175 
Journal of Quantitative Methods                                              Volume 5(1): 2021 
lower section of table 6). Finally, the estimates of model (6) are 
found to be stable based on the outcomes of CUSUM and CUSUM 
of Squares tests (see figure 2). 
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3.4. Defence Spending and Terrorism: Role of Institutional 
Quality  
The regression results for defence spending response to 
terrorism are reported in table 7. The upper section of table 7 
displays results for the long run relationship. The regression 
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significant, reflecting that the curse of terrorism matters for increase 
in military expenditure in Pakistan.  
Table 7. Defence Spending and Terrorism 
Dependent Variable: DFS 
Selected Model:ARDL(1,2,1,1,2,1) 
Regressor Coefficient t-value 
TER 0.234** 2.341 
GDPGR 0.080*** 6.023 
TB 0.225** 2.216 
AID 0.341* 1.814 
DFSI 0.438** 2.143 
Error Correction Model: Short Run Estimates 
Dependent Variable: D(DFS) 
Regressor Coefficient    t-value 
Constant 2.542*** 5.136 
D(TER) 0.084 1.671 
D(TER)t-1 0.013 0.758 
D(GDPGR) -0.053 -0.642 
D(TB) 0.086 0.169 
D(AID) 0.060 2.274 
D(AID)t-1 -0.03 -0.48 
D(DFSI) 0.162*** 6.581 
ECTt-1 -0.344*** -5.829 
Diagnostic Tests 
𝜒𝑆𝐶
2 = 0.332(0.551)                                     𝜒𝐻
2= 0.820(0.366)                                                                                                                                 
𝜒𝐹𝐹
2  =  0.818(0.362)                                    𝜒𝑁
2= 2.015(0.312) 




2   and  𝜒𝑁
2  denote LM test for serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, 
functional form  and normality  respectively. The associated p values are in 
parentheses.  
 
This finding is consistent with our prior expectation that terrorism 
forces a government to strengthen its national security and 
terrorism combating ability which demands for increasing public 
spending on these heads. The armed forces of Pakistan are actively 
involved in eradicating the evil of terrorism from the country. For 
the last fifteen years the strict actions have been taken on war 
footing to secure the homeland from terrorist attacks.Under these 
circumstances defence spending hasincreased which is more likely 
to divert the resources of the government from public sector 
Fiscal Response to Terrorism in Pakistan                                      |177 
Journal of Quantitative Methods                                              Volume 5(1): 2021 
development spending and social sector development programs to 
military expenditures in Pakistan.The positive relationship between 
defence spending and terrorism is also documented by (Nasir & 
Shahbaz, 2015; Gupta et al., 2004; Cevik & Ricco, 2015; Chuku et 
al., 2019; Zakaria et al., 2019) report that terrorism leads to an 
increase in overall fiscal spending. 
The coefficients of economic growth, trade balance, foreign aid 
and defence spending of India are all positive and significant 
indicating the vital contribution of these factors in defence 
spending of Pakistan in the long run. It is an undeniable fact that 
accelerating economic performance of a country ensures 
availability of resources to a government for increasing defence 
capability. The defence is categorised a public good and 
conventional theory of public finance postulates a 
positiverelationship between economic growth and defence 
spending. Trade balance (as percent of GDP) reflects trade 
openness which is also one of the indicators of defence 
expenditure. With the increase in the degree of a country’s 
integration with the world economy, it becomes easier for the 
country to access finance for the purchases of military equipment, 
leading to higher defence spending (Rosh, 1988). Since 1980s 
Pakistan has been practicing trade liberalization policies, therefore, 
positive impact of trade balance on defence spending in Pakistan is 
justified on the ground presented by Rosh (1988). Foreign aid 
tends to raise defence spending in Pakistan seems reasonably just 
as since 1950s the country has been found allied with the USA and 
its partner Western Powers against the socialist block during the 
Cold War era and the international terrorist organizations like Al-
Qaeda. The donors provided substantial amount of foreign aid 
which has been used by the successive governments in the country 
for meeting development and non-development targets including 
defence expenditures. Finally, we find that Pakistan’s defence 
spending positively responds to that of its arch rival India. This 
finding is in accordance with political and economic logic. The 
two neighbours have been engaged in rivalry and confrontation 
since their inception in 1947. Security threats occur not only from 
active warfare but also from an increasing military power of 
potential enemies. Hence, Pakistan’s defence budget positively 
responds to rise in India’s military purchases. Similar findings are 
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reported by (Chawla, 2001; Sheikh et al., 2013; Aslam et al., 
2014). These studies highlight that both countries keep an eye on 
each other defence expenditures. 
In the short run, however, number of terrorist incidents, economic 
growth performance and trade balance are found to be insignificant 
determinants of defence expenditure in Pakistan (see middle 
section of table 7). But the coefficients of foreign aid and defence 
spending of India are positive and significant, hence exhibit their 
due role in determining defence spending of the country even in 
the short run. The coefficient of lagged ECT is negative with 
statistical significance at 1% level, indicating that the equilibrium 
relationship of defence spending with all the explanatory variables 
is stable. The value of coefficient of lagged ECT is -0.344 which 
indicates that any deviation from the long run equilibrium between 
defence spending and its determinants will be corrected by 34% in 
each short run period i.e. a year. The robustness of the model has 
been confirmed by diagnostic tests reported as the lower section of 
table 7. The CUSUM and the CUSUMSQ graphical 
representations refer to the absence of any instability of the 
estimated parameters as the plots of these statistics remain within 
the critical bound of the 5% significancelevel (see figure 3). 
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We now move to table 8 which contains short run and long 
run parameter estimates of model (8). From top section of table 8, 
it is apparent that number of terrorist incidents, economic growth 
performance, trade balance, foreign aid and defence spending of 
India affectdefence spending of Pakistan positively and 
significantly in the long run. Here our main interest is identifying 
the impact of institutional quality and interaction term of terrorism 
and institutional quality on defence spending. The regression 
coefficient of institutional quality is negative and significant, 
implying that well-working institutions tend to decline the defence 
spending in Pakistan. This outcome is in line with our prior 
expectation. The existence of better working institutions is less 
prone to violence. Good qualities institutions are conducive in 
strengthening capabilities of a government to well manage 
domestic and foreign conflicts in a peaceful manner without going 
for a military solution (Desta, 2009). Pakistan does believe in 
settling its internal and external conflicts in a diplomatic manner so 
that military options can be avoided. Additionally, the quality of 
legal and political institutions also affects defence spending from 
other vital aspects. Firstly, a sound institutional set up is conducive 
to determining right priorities in defence allocations. It is quite 
certain that in total military expenditure there are some essential 
and relatively more wanted elements of spending which cannot be 
compromised while other elements are less important and wasteful 
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that ought to be minimised so that overall defence spending may 
remain within limits. High quality institutions may promote the 
former type of spending while weeding out the latter.  
Table 8. Defence Spending and Terrorism: Role of 
Institutions 
Dependent Variable: DFS 
Selected Model:ARDL(1,1,1,2,2,1,2,1) 
Regressor Coefficient t-value 
TER 0.272** 2.517 
GDPGR 0.117** 2.121 
TB 0.188*** 3.875 
AID 0.332* 1.889 
DFSI 0.457*** 6.841 
INS -0.095** -2.572 
TER*INS -0.102*** -3.585 
Error Correction Model: Short Run Estimates 
Dependent Variable: D(DFS) 
Regressor Coefficient    t-value 
Constant 1.533*** 7.643 
D(TER) 0.020 0.441 
D(GDPGR) 0.067 1.573 
D(TB) 0.134 0.727 
D(TB)t-1 0.116 0.482 
D(AID) 0.044 0.884 
D(AID)t-1 0.142 1.286 
D(DFSI) 0.218*** 4.244 
D(INS) -0.014 -0.339 
D(INS)t-1 -0.052 -1.262 
D(TER*INS) 0.086 0.984 
ECTt-1 -0.524*** -9.313 
 Diagnostic Tests  
𝜒𝑆𝐶
2 = 0.401(0.531)                                     𝜒𝐻
2= 0.794(0.374)                                                                                                                                 
𝜒𝐹𝐹
2  =  0.844(0.353)                                  𝜒𝑁
2= 2.213(0.292)   




2   and  𝜒𝑁
2  denote LM test for serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, 
Functional form and normality respectively. The associated p values are in 
parentheses. 
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In contrast, poor institutions may be unable to distinguish 
between good and bad military spending or may even create 
incentives for the latter (Compton & Paterson, 2016). Hence, 
quality of institutions does matter for reducing defence spending in 
a country like Pakistan. Secondly, prevalence of corruption in 
defence purchases cannot be overlooked which is likely to push up 
military outlays. However, effective and dynamic institutions 
ensure rule of law and accountability in a country, leading to 
significantly control corruption. Thus, establishment of a quality 
institutional structure is more likely to reduce the elements of 
corruption in military expenditure such that total defence outlays 
are reduced. Thirdly, an efficient working of institutions ensures 
correct priorities and appropriate policies and their effective 
implementation results in creating a conducive environment that 
encourages domestic and foreign investors to invest in productive 
activities. So, overall economic performance of a country gets 
improved and size of the economy widens. Under such a situation, 
defence spending as percent of GDP is likely to decline. 
Notably,the coefficient of interaction term of terrorism and 
institutional framework appears negative and statistically 
significant. The negative coefficient of the interaction term implies 
that good institutions will help in reducing uncertainty attached 
with terrorist attacks, therefore, a decline in defence spending to 
GDP ratio is experienced in wake of terrorist attacks in the 
presence of good quality institutional setup in Pakistan. Notably, 
when we compare the direct and conditional impact of terrorism on 
defence spending, it is observed that the size of direct impact 
(0.272) is higher than the conditional impact (-0.102), leaving the 
overall impact of terrorism on defence spending to remain positive 
[0.272 +(-0.102) = + 0.170]. Hence, once again we conclude that 
the current quality of institutions in Pakistan is not strong enough 
to completely eliminate the adversities of terrorism for fiscal 
policy.This finding is supported by a descriptive analysis of 
Badshah et al. (2012) who explains that the existing set of 
institutions are not capable to play significant role in combating the 
pitfalls of terrorism in terms of socio political destructions. 
Therefore, a new set of institutions would be required to combat 
this menace.   
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In short run, we find that only defence spending of India is 
a significant driver of the defence spending of Pakistan (see middle 
section of table 8). It implies that the decision- makers always keep 
an eye on military expenditure of India and they retaliate to any 
change in India’s defence budget. Number of terrorist incidents, 
institutional quality, their interaction and other explanatory variables 
fail to play any role in defence spending of Pakistan. 
 The coefficient of lagged ECT is negative and significant, 
showing the stability of the long run association between defence 
spending and all the explanatory variables. From the coefficient 
value of the lagged ECT, it is clear that almost 52% deviation from 
the equilibrium will be corrected every year. Finally, on the basis of 
four diagnostic tests we see that the model (8) does not suffer from 
serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, functional form and normality 
problems (see lower section of table 8). Moreover, results of 
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests also reveal stability of estimated 
model (see figure 4). 
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4. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Terrorism has serious socio-economic and political 
implications specifically for developing countries. Pakistan has a 
long history of being on the hit list of terrorist attacks due to 
several reasons such as religious, ethnic, political, and external. In 
particular, the incident of 9/11 has brought Pakistan to the front 
line of global terrorism and to-date the country is facing the 
consequences of the incident. 
The present study is conducted to quantify the fiscal 
consequences of terrorism in Pakistan. The country has devised 
several strategies to combat the adversities of terrorism.Notably, 
the fiscal burden of these actions is huge and is becoming 
unmanageable with the passage of time. By looking at the trend of 
defence spending, it is evident that the share of defence spending is 
increasing over time as the security requirements are increasing 
due to actual or perceived security threats.  In order to assess the 
fiscal response to terrorism in Pakistan, time series data from 1984 
to 2016 are employed. By usingthe ARDL estimation technique, 
the study finds that terrorism has significantly contributed in fiscal 
difficulties ofthe country. Particularly, the results indicate that an 
increase in the number of terrorist incidents not only increases the 
defence spending but it also reduces the tax revenues. Hence, 
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terrorism has detrimental impact on fiscal behaviour of Pakistan by 
deteriorating both sides of fiscal position.  
 The study has contributed in an important dimension in the 
existing literature by taking the moderating role of institutional 
qualityin terrorism-defence spending and terrorism–revenue 
collection relationship. The findings reveal that institutional quality 
helps in mitigating the adverse impact of terrorism on fiscal 
spending.  However, it only reduces the hazards of terrorism for 
revenue collection but not completely alleviates it. Hence, it 
necessitates the idea of improving the quality of institution to 
substantially tone down the adverse impact of terrorism on fiscal 
account of Pakistan.  
On the basis of the above findings, it is concluded that 
terrorism is detrimental for both aspects of the fiscal policy of 
Pakistan. It is evident that that government is taking various actions 
to control the terrorist activities at one hand, and to provide 
rehabilitation and reconstruction packages on the other hand. To 
effectively counter and control the terrorist incidents, the root cause 
of terrorism needs to be better identified so that appropriate anti-
terrorism strategy can be formulated and implemented.Just bringing 
an increase in defence and military spending will not sufficeto 
significantly eradicate the menace of terrorism completely. To this 
end,efforts ought to be made to improvethe quality of institutions for 
offsetting adverse implications of terrorism for fiscal actions of the 
government of Pakistan.  
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Annexure 
Table A1. Unit Root Test Results (Phillips and Perron ) 





Integration  Level 1stDifference 
TAX -1.830 -6.925 -2.960 I(1) 
TER                                         -2.276 -5.270 2.960 I(1) 
GDPGR -3.312 - 2.960 I(0) 
INF -2.406 -6.853 2.960 I(1) 
GE -0.717 -6.590 2.960 I(1) 
AID -2.046 -6.910 2.960 I(1) 
INS -1.519 -4.612 2.960 I(1) 
TER*INS -1.803 -7.860 -2.960 I(1) 
DFS -0.998 -4.814 2.960 I(1) 
TB -2.314 -6.128 2.960 I(1) 
DFSI -1.488 -4.844 2.960 I(1) 
 
Table A2a: Chow Break Test Results (TAX) 
Test Test statistics P-Value  
F-statistics 0.192 F(1,31)  
0.664 
Log likelihood ratio 0.204 Chi-Square(1) 
0.651 
Wald Statistic  0.192 Chi-Square(1) 
0.661 
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
 
Table A2b: Chow Break Test Results (DFS) 
Test Test statistics P-Value  
F-statistics 2.158 F(1,31)  
0.225 
Log likelihood ratio 2.202 Chi-Square(1) 
0.209 
Wald Statistic  2.184 Chi-Square(1) 
0.212 
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
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Table A3. PCA Estimates 
 
Principal Components Analysis    
Date: 11/10/18   Time: 19:36    
Sample: 1984 2016     
Included observations: 33    
Computed using: Ordinary correlations   
Extracting 5 of 5 possible components   
      
      Eigenvalues: (Sum = 5, Average = 1)   
    Cumulative Cumulative 
 
Number Value    Difference Proportion Value Proportion 
      
      1 1.682421 0.362309 0.4278 1.682421 0.4278 
2 1.320112 0.214099 0.2852 3.002533 0.7130 
3 1.106013 0.310800 0.1832 4.108546 0.8962 
4 0.795213 0.698972 0.1009 4.903759 0.9971 
5 0.096241 ---     0.0029 5.000000 1.0000 
      
      Eigenvectors (loadings):     
      
Variable PC 1   PC 2   PC 3   PC 4   PC 5   
      
      COR -0.340527 0.495022 0.614248 0.332557 0.388716 
DEA 0.554431 0.074891 -0.307963 0.725624 0.256176 
LOR 0.588286 0.168775 0.175276 -0.574247 0.514736 
BRQ 0.152592 0.821525 -0.201767 -0.110916 -0.498798 
ETT 0.455285 -0.214372 0.675594 0.144267 -0.519154 
      
      Ordinary correlations:    
       
 COR DEA LOR BRQ ETT 
COR 1.000000     
DEA -0.677873 1.000000    
LOR -0.642540 0.658343 1.000000   
BRQ -0.415237 0.437493 0.487972 1.000000  
ETT 0.075826 0.311009 -0.606668 -0.152035 1.000000 
      
      
